Â鶹ÒùÔº

Party power is key to autocrats maintaining control amid corruption, study finds

A new University of Massachusetts Amherst study provides fresh insights into why some autocratic governments, despite rampant corruption, draw fewer large-scale protests than others. The research, in the journal Democratization, shows that ruling parties with deep institutional roots can effectively insulate a ruler with absolute power from the destabilizing effects of corruption.

Using global data spanning 1955 to 2010 and a new measure of authoritarian party institutionalization, M. Rosemary Pang, lecturer of data analytics and computational social science at UMass Amherst, shows that the more institutionalized a ruling party is, the less likely protests are to topple a nondemocratic regime.

"Although corruption can increase anti-government protests, the level of ruling party institutionalization mitigates the impact of corruption on protests," Pang says.

The study presents three mechanisms by which these parties suppress anti-government demonstrations:

• Predictability of corruption—Institutionalized ruling parties create a structured system of corruption, making it more predictable, and therefore, less likely to spark outrage among citizens. When corruption follows a set pattern, individuals may view it as an inherent, albeit undesirable, feature of governance rather than an arbitrary abuse of power. However, this does not mean corruption is harmless—only that its effects on protest mobilization vary depending on how it is institutionalized.
• Distribution of corruption benefits—Unlike weakly institutionalized regimes, strong ruling parties distribute the economic benefits of corruption to a broader base of citizens, reducing grievances. By integrating more individuals into the corruption network, these regimes deter widespread opposition and create vested interests in maintaining the status quo.
• Channeling dissent into party mechanisms—Rather than eliminating discontent, institutionalized ruling parties provide controlled outlets for airing grievances, such as intra-party negotiations and policy adjustments. This can prevent unrest from escalating to protests.

Pang's measure of nondemocratic ruling party institutionalization considers factors such as party longevity, organizational strength and integration with civil society.

The research shows that while corruption generally correlates with increased protests in autocracies, this effect diminishes as ruling party institutionalization strengthens. In countries with entrenched parties in power, corruption has had little to no effect on protest levels, demonstrating the regime-stabilizing power of strong party structures.

Pang says this power can endure even as rulers come and go.

"In nondemocratic countries, simply removing a corrupt leader isn't enough. If the ruling party remains strong, it can contribute to suppressed opposition and sustain the system of corruption," she explains. "This is why promoting democracy should focus not just on individual leaders but on weakening the ruling-party institution."

While autocracies and democracies function differently, Pang says the importance of institutions transcends any single form of government.

"When institutions are robust in democracies, they can uphold norms and hold leaders accountable. But in both democracies and autocracies, when institutions weaken or become tools of political control, corruption and instability can follow," she adds.