Managing the tradeoffs between privacy and performance
When you go online to pay a bill or buy an airline ticket, says Parv Venkitasubramaniam, your transaction is subject to inevitable tradeoffs between privacy and utility.
While you expect your personal data to be protected from malicious actors, you also want the speediest possible transmission of data and completion of your transaction.
You can鈥檛 have both to the extent you might wish, says Venkitasubramaniam, an assistant professor of electrical and computer engineering.
鈥淥ur research shows fundamental tradeoffs do exist,鈥� he says. 鈥淵ou have to pay in terms of performance for the privacy you desire.鈥�
Venkitasubramaniam studies network security in hopes of improving anonymity, which means protecting the identities of communicating parties and the paths along which data flow. He recently received a five-year CAREER Award from the National Science Foundation.
His goal is to gain a quantitative understanding of the tradeoffs between utility and privacy and to write algorithms that let consumers know how much privacy they can expect according to the amount of utility they desire.
鈥淥ne person鈥檚 idea of privacy is not the same as another鈥檚. We want to design flexible algorithms that accommodate the desires of all classes of consumers鈥攖hose who want utility and don鈥檛 care about privacy, those who prefer privacy and aren鈥檛 too concerned about utility, and everyone in between.
鈥淥ur algorithms will tell users what to expect based on their desire for utility or privacy.鈥�
When timing is enough
Venkitasubramaniam is particularly interested in protecting network users against adversaries who gain valuable information about users or networks based on the timing of data transmission.
Network security experts seek hacker-proof encryption codes, he says, but adversaries can gain information about users or networks based solely on the timing of data transmission and the size of data packets. Encryption codes, he adds, do not guard against timing-backed information retrieval.
鈥淎dversaries need only detect the frequency and bandwidth of data-packet transmission. Once they have this information, they can launch an attack. They can jam someone, spoof an address or launch denial-of-service attacks once they know the location of certain servers.
鈥淧revious quantitative models did not consider the complete window of information available to adversaries. We were the first group to do this and the first to compute the fundamental relationship between privacy and utility.鈥�
Applications of this work include transportation and healthcare networks, and the energy-distribution network, or 鈥渟mart grid.鈥�
鈥淓ach network wants to hide information but does so in a different way,鈥� says Venkitasubramaniam. 鈥淎 smart grid, for example, inadvertently reveals the timing and pattern of energy requests. Our tools must understand the utility, or energy savings, you can get out of the grid versus the privacy you may have to sacrifice.
鈥淔or the grid customer, utility is the ability to cut energy use and costs based on pricing and energy-availability information. You as a customer respond in a certain manner to signals transmitted by the grid. But this reveals your usage patterns.
鈥淭he question is whether you can get meaningful utility out of the grid or any other network and still maintain your privacy.
鈥淥ur mathematical framework enables us to characterize the fundamental trade-offs between anonymity and network performance and to derive insights into the strategies and likely behavior of network 补诲惫别谤蝉补谤颈别蝉.鈥�
Provided by Lehigh University
