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Boeing crashes and Uber collision show passenger safety relies on corporate promises, not regulators' tests

Advanced technologies deliver benefits every day. But, sometimes interactions with technology can go awry and lead to disaster.

On March 10, the pilots aboard Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 were in one of the Boeing 737 Max 8's automated systems, resulting in a crash and the deaths of all passengers and crew. A year earlier, almost to the day, another automated vehicle – not an airplane but an Uber self-driving car – struck and in Tempe, Arizona.

As and , we know that it is in complex technological systems. These tragedies are the result of regulators and industry experts overlooking the complexities and risks of interactions between technologies and humans and increasingly relying on companies' voluntary self-assessment, rather than objective, independent tests. Tragically, that appears to have happened and the Uber car.

Risky business

The crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, as well as that of Lion Air Flight 610 in 2018, happened despite oversight from one of the most technologically capable regulators in the world. Air travel is in light of the potential risks.

Before the 737 Max 8 took to the air, it had to pass a series of Federal Aviation Administration inspections. Over the course of that process, that the , and that on the new plane.

The FAA cleared the 737 Max 8 and its flight control system to fly – and retained that clearance not only after the Lion Air crash, but also for the Ethiopian Airlines tragedy.

From airplanes to automobiles

As airplane automation is increasing, the same is true for cars. Various companies are – and with far less oversight than the aviation industry. Local and , often in the name of promoting innovation. Federal for autonomous vehicles require them to pass only the same performance tests as any other car, like minimum fuel economy standards, seat belt configurations and how well they'll protect occupants in a rollover crash.

There's no reliability testing of their sensors, much less their algorithms. Some states do require companies to – when the so-called "safety driver" resumes control over the automated system. But mostly the self-driving car companies are , so long as there is a person behind the wheel.

In the months before the March 2018 collision, to catch up with GM Cruise and Waymo. Uber's cars had a sensitive object-recognition system, which at times would be deceived by a shadow on the road and brake to avoid an obstacle that wasn't actually there. That resulted in a rough, stop-and-start ride. To smooth things out, Uber's engineers . The company appears to have assumed the single safety driver would always be able to stop the car in time if there was really a danger of hitting something.

That's not what happened as Elaine Herzberg crossed the road. The Uber self-driving car that hit and killed her , but was unable to stop on its own. The safety driver appears to have been – in violation of Uber's policies, though it's unclear how the company briefed its safety drivers about the change to the automated system.

Policing themselves

Regulators are relying on safety self-assessment practices, whereby private companies vouch for their own products' compliance with federal standards. The best assurances they – and members of the public – have for the safety and reliability of these vehicles are the guarantees of the companies who intend to sell them.

can be slim on hard evidence, touting the number of , without details of how the cars are performing under various conditions. And car companies are constantly releasing new models and , forcing human drivers to learn about the new features.

This is all the more unnerving because there are far more cars on the roads than there are planes in the air – in the U.S. alone, compared with . In addition, self-driving cars have to handle not just weather conditions but also close-range interactions with other cars, pedestrians, cyclists and e-scooters. Safety drivers don't get nearly the amount of training that pilots do, either.

Arizona, where we're based, is a popular place for public testing of autonomous vehicles, in part because of than in other states. In the Phoenix area, however, there is growing public concern about safety. Some citizens are in efforts to discourage them from driving through their neighborhoods. As one Arizona resident told The New York Times, the autonomous vehicle industry "said they need real-world examples, but I don't want to be ."

Connecting with the public, innovating responsibly

In the absence of federal safety standards for autonomous vehicles, states and local governments are left to protect the public – often without the expertise and resources to do so effectively. In our view, this doesn't mean banning the technology, but rather insisting on corporate transparency and true regulatory oversight.

Engaging the public about what's happening and who is – and isn't – protecting their safety can help officials at all levels of government understand what their citizens expect, and push them to ensure that technological innovation is done responsibly.

Universities can play an in supporting responsible innovation on these issues. The Arizona State University Center for Smart Cities and Regions is working with the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes to host .

Airplane and car passengers need to trust their vehicles and understand what risks are unavoidable – as well as what can be prevented. Relying on industry to self-regulate when lives and public trust are at stake is not a viable path to ensure that rapidly emerging innovations are developed and deployed responsibly. To the riders, customers and others sharing the road and the skies, there is only one bottom line – and it doesn't have a dollar sign attached to it.